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Publishing your article with us has many benefits, such as having access to a personal dashboard: This free service is available to anyone who has published and whose publication is in Scopus. Researcher Academy Author Services Try out personalized alert features. Within the economics-informed research paradigm several studies have already demonstrated that active enforcement can lead to improved financial reporting and generate associated positive market reactions, although experience in the US has been the predominant empirical focal point for such work e.
Sociopolitical and institutional studies have emphasized the fragmented organization of enforcement activity across economically, socially and culturally diverse regional and local levels and begun to explore developing regulatory arrangements seeking to deliver greater global consistency in compliance and enforcement processes Malsch and Gendron, ; Humphrey et al. This special issue seeks to promote and develop understanding of financial reporting enforcement processes, practices and experiences at international, regional and local levels, particularly those that explore the pertinence and influence of different regulatory attitudes, cultural contexts and conditions.
Consistent with the editorial policy of Accounting and Business Research , we welcome papers across a broad range of theoretical perspectives and methods. In particular, the special issue will consider the following topics although papers may address other relevant topics:.
Manuscripts should be submitted online at http: Author guidelines can be found here. It is anticipated that this special issue will be published in mid Through their internal capital markets, multinational firms can raise funding in one location and deploy it elsewhere. Internally available financial capital gives multinationals an advantage over purely domestic firms in some circumstances.
Financial considerations often shape the extent to which multinationals generate spillovers for local firms. The ability to access financial capital to pay fixed and variable costs affects choices firms make regarding export entry and operations, and, as a consequence, influence aggregate trade patterns. Multinationals may use internal capital markets to pay for fixed costs, address managerial moral hazard, and exploit differences in access to capital across countries.
As a result, financial frictions shape multinational decisions regarding production location, integration, and corporate governance. In essence, crony capitalism conveys a shared point of view-sometimes stretching to collusion-among industries, their regulators, and Congress. The result is business-friendly policies and investments that serve private interests at the expense of the public interest.
In this research paper, the author's goal is to add precision and nuance to our understanding of this form of corruption. He does so first by exploring definitions of crony capitalism. He then outlines the toolkit of crony capitalism including 1 campaign contributions to elected officials, 2 heavy lobbying of Congress and rule-writing agencies, and 3 a revolving door between government service and the private sector.
The paper next describes the costs of cronyism and concludes with innovative ideas for curbing the excesses of crony capitalism. As the author notes, thorny problems remain: The line between corrupt cronyism and legitimate bargaining among self-interested parties in the halls of government may be blurry.
Although the costs to taxpayers of direct and even indirect subsidies can be measured, quantifying the cost of violations of the principle of equal treatment by government, the distortion of market mechanisms, and the undermining of public trust in government and business is vastly more difficult. The US has a long history of attempted campaign finance reform, which is critical to curbing crony capitalism.
In the absence of meaningful reform, one corrupting feature of federal campaigns has not changed. Today 85 percent of funding for congressional campaigns comes from large contributors-mainly wealthy individuals and corporations. Among other necessary reforms, we need to take seriously the need to minimize trust-destroying conflicts of interest in Congress and privileged access by influential business interests to Congress and regulatory agencies.
In the absence of such reform, the many benefits of the espoused system of democratic capitalism cannot endure. The secret sauce for surviving from generation to generation, says family-business expert John Davis, has three main ingredients: Open for comment; 2 Comment s posted. Corporate reporting plays two functions. The first is an "information function" that enables counterparties, such as investors, employees, customers, and regulators, to enter into an exchange of goods and services under specific terms.
Companies also benefit from the information function by comparing their performance against peers, thereby informing internal resource allocation decisions. The second is a "transformation function," the result of a company engaging with stakeholders to get their input on the company's resource allocation decisions. The authors argue that integrated reporting is more likely to perform effectively these two functions than separate financial and sustainability reporting. Moreover, as the authors argue, these two functions vary in terms of how important the role of regulation is.
Regulation and standard setting is likely to improve the information function but could well impede the transformation function. If regulation is too prescriptive and "rules-based," the risk is that integrated reporting becomes more of a compliance exercise. Investors need a better understanding of how companies are managing the relationships between financial and nonfinancial performance. Separate financial and sustainability reports are no longer adequate for performing either the information function or the transformation function.
Companies need integrated reporting in order to make sure that their corporate reporting process effectively performs the information and transformation functions. Many commentators and policymakers observed that this so-called "dead money" might be one reason behind the sluggish performance of the United States and other developed economies since the Great Recession.
But evidence on such cash-hoarding behavior is limited to listed or 'public' firms, which account for a relatively small part of the US economy.
Do private firms also hold large cash balances? Using a rich panel of over , non-SEC-filing private US firms, the author finds that the average public firm holds twice as much cash as the average large private firm over the period. Results are most consistent with the hypothesis that differences in the extent to which public and private firms engage in market timing are a key driver of public firms' higher demand for cash, as the risk of misvaluation induces public firms to raise capital and accumulate precautionary cash reserves when they perceive their equity to be overvalued.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the author finds that the cash difference between public and private firms is larger in industries with a higher prevalence of misvaluation shocks. In addition, public firms in these industries tend to save a larger fraction of their equity issuance proceeds than private firms, particularly in times when they have reasons to believe that their equity is overvalued.
Private firms are a large and underexplored part of the US economy. This paper underscores the limitations of extrapolating what we know about public firms to private firms.
Prior literature studying railway accounting during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries defends the thesis of lack of reliability of accounting figures. This prior research, which mainly studies the cases of the United Kingdom and the United States, offers mixed views on the causes, or simply accepts this thesis without providing conclusive evidence, as is the case of historical research in Spain.
Consistent with the editorial policy of Accounting and Business Research, we welcome papers across a broad range of theoretical perspectives and methods. In particular, the special issue will consider the following topics (although papers may address other relevant topics). The Journal of Accounting Research is a general-interest accounting journal. It publishes original research in all areas of accounting that utilizes tools from basic disciplines such as economics, statistics, psychology, and sociology.
The set of journals have been ranked according to their SJR and divided into four equal groups, four quartiles. Q1 (green) comprises the quarter of the journals with the highest values, Q2 (yellow) the second highest values, Q3 (orange) the third highest values and Q4 (red) the lowest values. The most cited papers from this title published in the last 3 years. Statistics are updated weekly using participating publisher data sourced exclusively from Crossref.